En este artículo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional (de dicto) y no-proposicional (de re) a través de su teoría de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo ..

Some philosophers think that anti-realism about de re necessity entails anti-realism about the individuation and identity of objects. In this paper I address one argument for this view, due to Sidelle, according to which the only way in which a de re modal conventionalist can avoid being refuted by a well-known argument based on the contingency of conventions is by also accepting conventionalism about objects. I show that Sidelle’s argument is not successful and, in this way, I also show that (...) the combination of de re modal anti-realism and realism about objects is at least not threatened from this direction. (shrink)